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ABSTRACT
Yara rules are a ubiquitous tool among cybersecurity practitioners
and analysts. Developing high-quality Yara rules to detect a mal-
ware family of interest can be labor- and time-intensive, even for
expert users. Few tools exist and relatively little work has been
done on how to automate the generation of Yara rules for specific
families. In this paper, we leverage large n-grams (n ≥ 8) combined
with a new biclustering algorithm to construct simple Yara rules
more effectively than currently available software. Our method, Au-
toYara, is fast, allowing for deployment on low-resource equipment
for teams that deploy to remote networks. Our results demonstrate
that AutoYara can help reduce analyst workload by producing rules
with useful true-positive rates while maintaining low false-positive
rates, sometimes matching or even outperforming human analysts.
In addition, real-world testing by malware analysts indicates Auto-
Yara could reduce analyst time spent constructing Yara rules by 44-
86%, allowing them to spend their time on the more advanced mal-
ware that current tools can’t handle. Code will be made available at
https://github.com/NeuromorphicComputationResearchProgram.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Machine Learning has become more involved in malware detection
systems and cybersecurity, but older signature-based approaches
are still an important tool. In particular, Yara [3] is widely used to
specify signatures and perform searches. Yara is a tool to combine
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content matching against simple regular expressions with logic
rules, and these rules ‘fire’ if the predicates are satisfied. These
predicates combined are often called ‘Yara Rules’, and may be used
to identify specific malware families, the presence of CVEs, specific
signatures of functionality, or generic indicators of maliciousness.
Developing effective Yara rules can be very time intensive, espe-
cially for junior analysts who lack deeper expertise and intuition
on what should be included in a Yara rule to achieve a goal. For ex-
ample, a related task in performing reverse engineering (a task that
may be necessary to build good signatures for difficult malware
samples) can take several hours to weeks for a single file, even for
expert users with over a decade of experience [33]. In our experi-
ence, analysts rarely get through all of their “necessary” tasks and
work under a continually growing backlog of samples that need to
be analyzed or have rules created. Despite Yara’s widespread use,
only a few works have attempted to automate the development of
Yara rules.
We consider the problem of trying to develop a Yara rule to
identify a specific malware family given only a limited number of
example files from that family. A common workflow in developing
Yara rules is tomanually inspect multiple files to determine common
contents, wrapped by trial-and-error refinement of the developed
rules, where success is measured against coverage and false positive
rates on a collection that includes benign or out-of-family files.
In this paper, we are concerned with two practical use-cases.
First, a “hunt” team is deployed to an unfamiliar network after the
discovery of malicious files. To determine the extent of the attack
they craft Yara rules to perform a broader search across the network.
In this scenario, there are two primary concerns: 1) Yara rules that
generate a lot of false positives (e.g. returning a significant amount
of benign files) could slow the investigation and 2) security workers
often have fewer (≤ 10) samples when creating a Yara rule. The
second scenario is based on scaling Yara rule construction to track
specific malware families that are known to be difficult to correctly
classify, due to their structural resemblance to benign software, or
because they are polymorphic in nature. We test this scenario on
live production data to demonstrate that our approach could save
analysts significant time spent constructing Yara rules.
We stress that our objective is not to entirely replace a human
analyst in producing Yara rules. A skilled analyst will likely be able
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to produce better rules than our tool given the time, and techniques
such as packing will successfully thwart our tools. The goal is to
provide a tool that can produce rules that are good enough that they
can often be used without alteration, or quickly improved so that
analysts can get through their workload faster. Given a satisfying
AutoYara result, analysts can spend their limited and valuable time
working on more challenging samples and tasks that do not yet
yield to automation.
r u l e Ana ly s t {
s t r i n g s :
$a = " 191231235959 Z0U1 " , $b = " downloader " wide
$c = " 1 . 0 . 2 . 4 1 7 " wide
c ond i t i o n :
$a and $b and $c
}
r u l e YarGen {
s t r i n g s :
$ s1 = "5054585 <5@5D5H5T5X5 \ \ 5 5 d5h5 " f u l lwo r d a s c i i
$ s2 = " 0 0 $0 ( 0 , 0 0 0 4 0 8 0 D0T0X0d0h0l0 ( 6 " f u l lwo r d a s c i i
. . .
$ s20 = " </ <B<P<T<X< \ \ < < d<h<" f u l lwo r d a s c i i
c o n d i t i o n :
( u i n t 1 6 ( 0 ) == 0 x5a4d and
f i l e s i z e < 1000KB and
pe . imphash ( ) == " 50542991 f a b 9 5 f 9 e e 9 1 0 f 4 8 e 0 f d 7 f 1 1 4 "
and ( 8 o f ( $s ∗ ) )
) or ( a l l o f them )
}
r u l e AutoYara {
s t r i n g s :
$x1 = { 07 A2 4F E5 87 . . . DC EC }
. . .
$x31 = { CF E8 A5 30 57 . . . B0 8E }
c o n d i t i o n :
( 2 0 o f ( $x0 , $x1 , . . . , $x26 ) ) or ( 7 o f ( $x27 , . . . , $x35 ) )
}
Figure 1: Examples of Yara rules generated by 1) an analyst,
2) YarGen and 3) our AutoYara.
Examples of Yara rules generated by an analyst, a prior method
called YarGen, and our new AutoYara are shown in Figure 1. An-
alysts can use their expertise to select the salient factors to make
compact and effective rules. Prior tools like YarGen rely on a num-
ber of heuristics and string features and have varying levels of
effectiveness. Our new approach makes larger rules, but uses the re-
dundancy and conjunction of components to achieve the extremely
low false-positive rates that analysts desire.
We perform this task in two steps. First, we leverage recent
work in finding frequent larger n-grams, for n ≤ 1024, to find
several candidate byte strings that could become features. Second,
we extend the SpectralCoClustering algorithm to work when the
number of biclusters is not known a priori. We will show that
biclustering allows us to easily produce complex logic rules that
allow us to build signatures with low false positive rates, e.g. ≤ 0.1%.
Third, we perform the first production comparison of signature
generation against professional analysts, giving us a benchmark for
human ability and the relative effectiveness of the AutoYara tool.
We review the related work on automated Yara rule construction
forWindows PE executables in § 2. The intuition on howwewill use
biclustering, and our improved method for it, is given in § 3. Next,
we discuss the design of our AutoYara system in § 4, which uses our
bicluster algorithm with only a few simple pruning steps to build
a Yara rule. We review the datasets used for building AutoYara in
§ 5. We perform extensive and real-world evaluations in § 6, where
we see that AutoYara can be effective for the scenarios in which we
are interested. § 7 presents an initial investigation into AutoYara’s
results compared to a human analyst. Finally, we summarize the
approach and results in § 8.
2 RELATEDWORK
Yara [3] is an industry standard regular expression tool designed
for malware analysis. Many malware analysis tools support Yara
directly, so we want to look at methods which also create compati-
ble signatures. The only other tools that are readily available and
actively maintained for generating Yara rules from example files
are YarGen [29] and VxSig [5], which is considered state-of-the-art.
Other works have developed malware family classification models
and called these approaches “signatures” as well (e.g., [7]). These
systems do not produce Yara rules, however, so we do not consider
them viable alternatives.
YarGen uses a Naive Bayes model to score the potential utility of
features that can be extracted from a binary, predominately strings.
Then YarGen uses a number of heuristics to select the features to use,
and combines them in a heuristic fashion. The authors of YarGen
encourage its use as a starting point for rule construction, and to
build rules by manually adjusting and refining YarGen’s output.
This recommendation aligns with our experience, where YarGen
often produces rules with 0 hits, and requires alteration to be useful.
The other existing and available approach was proposed by Blich-
mann [5], which uses a least-common-subsequence (LCS) algorithm
to find byte sequences, extracted from functions, that appear to be
common to all files in the given sample. This constrains their rules
to only code, where our approach can leverage information found
from all regions of a binary. We compare against the VxSig1 im-
plementation of this approach. While a powerful tool, we found in
practice that VxSig required human intervention to make it work,
and could take hours per malware sample to run. Details about the
approach we used with VxSig to increase the rate of successful rule
production can be found in Appendix B.
There are a number of prior works that could be described as
“Greedy” rule construction, which also leveraged large n ∈ [32, 256]
byte grams to create rules from an input. These works have gener-
ally pursued a strategy of collecting a large set of malware (≥ 10, 000
samples ) that corresponds to multiple families, and sought to cre-
ate a set of rules to cover the maximum set of input files with few
false positives [11, 15]. These greedy construction approaches have
often used discriminative models like Naive Bayes — similar to
YarGen [34]. Signatures were constructed by greedily adding byte-
grams based on a number of different strategies. The most recent
work by Griffin et al. [9] required 33 GB of benign data available to
cover 48k malicious files, with 48-gram features needing a 17.5GB
Markov language model and another 52 GB for a search index. We
have implemented a representative greedy strategy in this work,
which we will refer to as the “Greedy” method. To make this Greedy
1https://github.com/google/vxsig
2
Automatic Yara Rule Generation Using Biclustering AISec’20, November 13, 2020, Virtual Event, USA
method run in a reasonable amount of time, we have replaced the
larger multi-GB indexes with the KiloGram approach. The Greedy
approaches do not work well in our situation because we are try-
ing to build rules for a specific family with as few as two examples.
Our results also differ in that we develop a biclustering based strat-
egy to build complex logic rules, that we found more effective than
greedy search.
For computational efficiency, our AutoYara system leverages the
recently proposed work in “KiloGrams” that demonstrates how to
find the top-k most frequent n-grams in a computationally efficient
manner with fixed memory cost [20, 21, 23]. Their work argued
that these large byte grams can be used as Yara rules. However,
their approach could not be deployed operationally, as it requires
having all training data available and building a new model from
scratch for every Yara rule, and an even distribution of malware
samples between all families. This is impractical.
We note that others have elucidated a number of fundamental
limits on the potential effectiveness of classical signatures and
attempts to learn signatures [15, 32], and that learning signatures
can be subject to adversarial attacks that hamper signature creation
[16, 18]. Indeed, approaches like packing can easily thwart the
Yara signatures we wish to generate. We are not challenging or
circumventing any of these fundamental limits. They are aweakness
of any signature based approach. But since signatures are still a
widely used tool, we believe there is value in improving these
processes with the understanding that such tools are useful, if not
perfect.
3 IMPROVED SPECTRAL COCLUSTERING
To create our Yara rule signatures, we will make use of bicluster-
ing algorithms as the fundamental mechanism of rule construction.
The goal of bi-cluster is to take an input matrix X , and to simulta-
neously cluster the rows and columns of the matrix to reveal an
underlying structure between columns and rows [10]. An example
of a biclustering is given in Figure 2.
In Figure 1 we see that three bi-clusters were found. In general,
biclusters may overlap in rows or columns, and several rows and/or
columns may not belong to any bicluster. We are interested in
biclustering because it gives us a natural means to extract Yara
rules. To build a good Yara rule, we want to know 1) which features
should be used at all, and 2) which features should be combined
into an “and” statement (would reduce FPs), and which should be
placed into an “or” statement (would increase TPs).
Our first contribution is that biclustering gives us a simple ap-
proach to do this jointly over the features, rather than consider-
ing greedy approaches that select features one at a time. For ev-
ery feature within a bicluster, we <and> them together since they
co-occur, and we <or> the predicates built from biclusters. This
results in a “disjunction of conjunctions” rule formulation, where,
referring back to Figure 2, we build the rule over the features Fi as
(F1 ∧ F2 ∧ F3) ∨ (F5 ∧ F6 ∧ F7 ∧ F8) ∨ (F7 ∧ F8 ∧ F9 ∧ F10). In this
way can build complex rules with multiple terms, with sharing of
terms between clauses.
The difficulty is in performing the biclustering process itself. In
particular, themajority of biclustering algorithms require specifying
the number of biclusters in advance [27], which is unknown in our
Figure 2: Illustration of the type of biclustering we wish to
find. It tells us that three groups of features (red, green, &
blue) could be useful to create a signature that covers all 9
samples. It also identifies that the “Evil.exe” feature would
not be useful in this case.We donot care if biclusters overlap,
as multiple clauses can use the same features.
situation, and enforce no overlap between biclusters. We desire a
biclustering method that can determine the number of biclusters
automatically, even if it is only one bicluster, allows overlapping
biclusters, and will discard rows and columns that do not fit in any
bicluster.
We develop this by extending the seminal SpectralCoClustering
approach of [8]. Their approach is widely used for both its simplicity
and effectiveness. By computing the Singular Value Decomposition
(SVD) of a normalized input matrix A ∈ Rr,c , they create a new
matrix Z ∈ Rr+c, log2 k , where the first r rows of Z correspond to
the original r rows of A, and the remaining rows of Z correspond
to the columns of A. The number of features in the transformed
matrix is log2 k , where k is the desired number of biclusters. The
biclusters are then found by running the k-means algorithm on Z ,
and the rows of Z found in the cluster tell us which rows/columns
of A are in the final biclustering. [8] proved that this corresponds
to a weighted cut of the bipartite graph to perform biclustering.
We augment this strategy to jointly perform biclustering while
automatically determining the number of clusters. The details are
outlined in Algorithm 1, where S are the sample inputs and G the
set of input features that make the rows and columns, respectively,
of the matrix A. Lines 1 through 7 proceed in the same manner as
standard SpectralCoClustering, except we use a larger set of features
for the matrixZ . We then use a Variational Gaussian Mixture Model
(VGMM) [6, 25] to perform the clustering instead of k-means, as
the VGMM algorithm can automatically determine the number of
clusters to use. In particular, we use a diagonal covariance constraint
on the GMM so that if we have extraneous clusters, the VGMM
can learn to ignore the extra dimensions in Z , which should exhibit
homogeneity in the coefficients due to the excessive number of
3
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Algorithm 1 Adaptive SpectralCoClustering
Require: Set of files/data points S, and set of n-gram features G
1: construct matrixA ∈ Rr,c , where r = |S| is the number of data
points and c = |G| is the number of columns / n-gram features
2: Ri,i =
∑c
j=1 A˜i, j
3: Cj, j =
∑r
i=1 A˜i, j
4: Compute normalized matrix An = R−1/2AC−1/2
5: Set max SVD dimensions ℓ ← log2 (min(r , c)/2) ▷The
following two lines show ’Scale’ based normalization. One could
also use bistochastic or log-based normalization proposed in [12]
6: U , S,V ← ThinSVD(An , ℓ+1)
7: Z ←
[
R−1/2U
C−1/2V
]
, a new dataset in Rr+c, ℓ
8: µ1, . . . , µk , Σ1, . . . , Σk ← Variational GMM [6, 25] clustering
results on the r + c rows of Z
9: B ← empty set of bi-clusters
10: for all GMM clusters µi , Σi do
11: αi ← all rows j of Z s.t. P (zk | N(µi , Σi )) > 1/(k + 1)
12: for all αi do ▷Filter out biclusters that contain essentially only
rows from S or only columns from G
13: if
∑
∀j ∈αi 1[j ≤ r ] ≤ 1 or
∑
∀j ∈αi 1[j > r ] ≤ 1 then
14: discard/remove cluster αi
15: cmin ← min
(
5, arg maxi
∑
∀j ∈αi 1[j > r ]
)
16: rmin ← min
(
5, arg maxi
∑
∀j ∈αi 1[j ≤ r ]
)
17: for all αi do
18: if
∑
∀j ∈αi 1[j ≤ r ] < rmin or
∑
∀j ∈αi 1[j > r ] < cmin
then
19: discard αi
20: return remaining k ′ biclusters B = (R1,C1), . . . , (Rk ′ ,Ck ′)
where the rows of S in each bicluster αi correspond to Ri =
{j ∈ αi | j ∈ Z[1 : r ]}, and the columns/features of G selected
are Ci = {j ∈ αi | j ∈ Z[r + 1 : r + c]}
dimensions no longer forming a meaningful cut in the bipartite
graph clustering.
On line 11 we use the probabilities of cluster membership com-
puted by the VGMM to select any row (sample) with a probability
≥ 1/(k + 1) of belonging to each bicluster. We use k + 1 in the de-
nominator so that multi-bicluster membership can still occur with
k = 2 biclusters.
In lines 12-18 of the algorithm, we perform removal of extraneous
clusters. First we remove clusters that contain only rows from A\S,
and only columns from A\G, as these biclusters are degenerate and
uninformative. In the next stepwe filter out clusters that contain less
than 5 rows or columns fromA as being spurious, unless the largest
clusters contain fewer than 5 rows/columns, at which point we set
the limit to the largest observed. This allows us to avoid spurious
clusters while adapting to work in scenarios with small sample
sizes that occur in malware analysis (e.g., ≤ 10 samples), but would
not normally be of interest in standard biclustering applications.
4 AUTOYARA DESIGN
In designing the AutoYara tool, a number of design constraints
informed our approach. First, the tool must be light-weight enough
that it can run on low resource machines (e.g., a laptop with 4
GB of RAM or less) to support the maximal number of analysts,
who do not always have significant compute resources available.
Toward this goal, we needed to minimize memory use and model
size in memory, as well as reliance on any GPU resources. This
allows analysts who take “fly-away” kits with them to unfamiliar
networks to begin investigations into the network, encountering
whatever novel malware that may be present [17]. We also need
the tool to produce Yara rules within minutes, as our experience
has been that analysts will not, in general, use tools requiring them
to wait hours or more. Finally, we need to produce Yara rules that
can be interpreted by analysts. This makes it is possible for analysts
to gain insights that may aid their work by inspecting the rules or
even modify the rules to improve them.
We assume the user will provide multiple files that share some
intrinsic nature (e.g., same malware family), which we would like
to identify with a Yara rule. We focus on building Yara rules based
on specific byte patterns. For this reason we use large byte n-grams,
where n ∈ [8, 1024]. Prior work has developed an algorithm to
extract the top-k most frequent n-grams for large values of n with
limited memory, in time almost invariant to n, and has noted that
these large byte-grams are interpretable to malware analysts [20].
To make sure that we only consider interesting n-grams for rule
construction, we will perform filtering of the selectedn-grams. First,
we will use a large training corpus of 600,000 files to find generally
frequent n-grams. If an n-gram is frequent across a large portion of
these files, it is unlikely to make a good signature — as signatures
need to be specific. To store these compactly, we will use a Bloom
Filter for each n-gram size, storing the top 1 million most frequent
n-grams for n ∈ 8, 16, 32, . . . , 1024 if they occur in more than 0.1%
of the training files.
Algorithm 2 Filter Simple
Require: Set of files/data points S, and set of n-gram features G,
bloom filters Fn
1: for all byte n-grams дi ∈ G do
2: z =
∑
j ∈дi 1[j = 0x00] + 1[j = 0xFF ] ▷Count number of
bytes equal to 0 or 255
3: if z ≥ |дi |/2 then
4: remove дi
5: else if H (дi ) ≤ 1.0 then ▷Byte entropy of too small
6: remove дi
7: else if дi ∈ bloom filter F |дi | then
8: remove дi
9: For each pair of n-grams дi and дj , if they both occur in exactly
the same files in S, keep the n-gram with the highest entropy
and discard the other.
10: return remaining n-grams дi that were not removed.
We use two other strategies for removing n-grams unlikely to
be useful for clustering. First we consider the entropy of an n-gram
x , as given in Equation 1, where Pi (x) denotes the proportion of
bytes with value i (i.e, Pi (x) = ∑n−1j=0 1[x[j] = i]/n).
4
Automatic Yara Rule Generation Using Biclustering AISec’20, November 13, 2020, Virtual Event, USA
H (x) = −
255∑
i=0
Pi (x) · log (Pi (x)) (1)
The byte entropy of a sequence would then be in the range of
[0,8], with 8 corresponding to content that appears completely ran-
dom, and 0 for the same value repeated alone. For context, natural
language text usually has an entropy value ≈ 4. We use a filter of
1.0 to remove n-grams. We also check if more than half of the bytes
have the value 0 or 0xFF, which are commonly used in padding and
can be unreliable. This gives us a simple filtering strategy given by
Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 3 AutoYara
Require: Benign & malicious training corpora C. Top-k value k .
Initial n-gram sizenl, minimum entropymh , and filter threshold
ft .
1: function BuildIndex(Corpus C)
2: for i ∈ 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, . . . , 1024 do
3: G ← Find top-k most frequent ni-grams using Kilo-
Gram Algorithm[20].
4: Create new counting Bloom Filter Fni
5: for all д ∈ G do ▷Populate Bloom Filter
6: c ←Count(д)
7: Fni .Insert(д, c)
8: function BuildYaraRule(Sample files S)
9: Current Best Rule Rbest ← 0
10: Current best score sbest ← 0
11: for i ∈ 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, . . . , 1024 do
12: G ← Find top-k most frequent ni-grams using [20].
13: FilterSimple(G, Fni mh , ft ) ▷Using Algorithm 2
14: B ← Bicluster(S, G) ▷Using Algorithm 1
15: Create empty rule R ← ∅
16: Create set covered ← ∅
17: for Row-column tuple R,C ∈ B do
18: Let Count(c) be the number of times feature c ∈ C
be the number of files in S that feature/ni -gram c occurred in.
19: Let σi :j indciate the variance of Count(ci ),
Count(ci+1), . . ., Count(c j ) where the counts are sorted from
minum to maximum.
20: t ← arg min
s
s · σ 21:s + (n − s) · σ 2s :n
21: R ← R ∧ (t of C)
22: covered ← covered ∪ R
23: s ← |covered ||S | ·
min(5, |⋃R,C∈B ⋃∀c∈C |)
5
24: if s > sbest then ▷We found a better YaraRule
25: sbest ← s
26: Rbest ← R
27: return Yara rule Rbest
We now have all the information we need to specify our new
AutoYara algorithm for constructing Yara rules from raw bytes. This
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3. First the BuildIndex function
creates Bloom Filters for each value of n considered. These take up
about 33 MB of disk each, and is done once in advance.
The BuildYaraRule does the majority of the work to create a Yara
rule that hopefully matches the set of files given in S. For every
n-gram size n, we will extract the top-k most frequent grams, use
Algorithm 2 to remove unlikely features, and then Algorithm 1 to
create a biclustering of the data. As described in § 3, each feature
used within a bicluster is merged into a larger clause by “and”ing
the terms together, and “or”ing the biclusters together.
To improve the quality of the biclustering, on lines 19-21, we do
not naively “and” every n-gram found within a bicluster. Instead,
we select a threshold t of the rules to be found, as not every feature
will always appear in a new file. This threshold is selected based
on the same heuristic used in decision trees. We take the number
of occurrences of each feature c ∈ C in the input samples and
sort them from fewest to most frequent occurrences. We then find
the split that minimizes the variance in counts and use that as the
threshold for the number of features/n-grams used to satisfy this
specific clause. This approach assumes that there will be some set
of n-grams that are useful features and common, and a second
population of n-grams that are excessively frequent because they
are generically frequent.
These biclusters are evaluated based on the coverage of the
input files S, and we rely on the length of the rules and the n-
grams themselves to avoid false positives. If a developed Yara rule
R obtains 100% coverage, it will be selected as the final rule. We
note that in line 20, we also include a penalty based on the number
of n-gram components used in the candidate rule. If |R | denotes
the number of n-gram features used in a rule, we are penalizing
the rule by a factor of |R |/5 if |R | < 5. This is done to avoid false
positives, as we prefer rules with more terms to bias our method to
low false-positive rates.
Our final implementation of AutoYara is in Java to enable use on
multiple operating systems and fast execution time. It can be found
at https://github.com/NeuromorphicComputationResearchProgram,
and uses the JSAT library [19] to implement the biclustering.
5 DATASETS
To train our AutoYara system, we will use the Ember 2017 corpus
[4], which contains a training set of 300,000 benign and 300,000
malicious files. We use only this data to create our Bloom Filters
used during the entire process. By using both benign and malicious
files to build our Bloom Filters, we obtain better coverage to hope-
fully ensure a low false positive rate. We explicitly do not use the
test set of Ember at any point. First, the test set is organized by
benign vs. malicious, which is not the ultimate goal of AutoYara.
More importantly, we want to maximize the difficulty of our eval-
uation to better judge the generalization properties of AutoYara.
By using different data that was collected from different sources,
we decrease the similarity between training and testing data, thus
getting a better judgment of generalization and utility to real life
situations in which analysts would use this tool [2, 14, 24, 28].
We expected AutoYara to be run only on malicious files that
are related in some manner (e.g., a malware family) of interest to
the analyst. For this purpose, we construct a larger dataset using
VirusShare [26] to get a large corpus of malware. To determine the
family labels for this corpus, we use the AVClass tool [30] to coalesce
the outputs of multiple anti-virus products from VirusTotal [1]
reports collected by [31]. This gives us a larger dataset to perform
evaluations on, but is still susceptible to noisy labels provided by
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AV products, and imperfect coalescing by AVClass in selecting a
final label. As such this is our noisiest test data.
Because we want to investigate the impact on the number of
samples with respect to tool accuracy, we decided to select mal-
ware families from VirusShare that had at least 10,000 examples
each. This gave us 184 total malware families. For each family, we
randomly selected 2,000 files to be a test set and sample from the re-
mainder for training. For each family, we will ask AutoYara (trained
on Ember) to create a Yara rule, for which we will determine the
true-positive rate from the 2,000 samples.
To measure false-positive rates, we will evaluate each generated
rule on the remaining 183 other families. However, it is possible
that the false positive rate may differ significantly between benign
and malicious out-of-class samples. To maximize the difficulty and
best judge generalization, we use the 200,000 benign and 200,000
malicious files used by [22], as a special held-out corpus. This
allows us to measure false-positive rates as low as 10−6, and we will
routinely see that our method can obtain exactly 0 false positives.
We will also use a dataset provided by Elastic taken from a pro-
duction environment. In particular, Elastic had 24 different malware
families for which there was a production need to write Yara rules to
identify these specific families. Two expert analysts (A and B) with
≥ 5 years experience recorded their time/progress on these families
through the course of a normal workday, allowing us to show how
AutoYara can save an analyst over 44% of their time in rule con-
struction to better meet their mission requirements. A third analyst
(C) with ≥ 2 years experience was given no other tasking but to
process all 24 families and create rules for them. Analyst C had not
previously used Yara, but had prior reverse engineering experience.
6 EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
Now that we have described our AutoYara concept, and reviewed
the procedure for determining the search policy AutoYara uses to
build Yara rules, we will investigate its performance on three tasks.
For these tasks, the guidance Elastic uses is that a rule needs to have
a false positive (FP) rate ≤ 0.1% for a rule to be potentially useful.
The utility of a rule depends on the true positive (TP) rate and the
degree of need for the rule. To simplify analysis, we will describe
the performance of the rules as a whole using the Fβ metric, as
given in Equation 2. The Fβ score gives us a measure where we
can state that a true positive is more/less important than a false
positive. As such, we use β = 0.001, corresponding to each false
positive being worse than a false negative in line with our desire
that FP should be ≤ 0.1%.
Fβ =
(
1 + β2
) · true positive(
1 + β2
) · true positive + β2 · false negative + false positive
(2)
First, we will compare AutoYara with YarGen and the Greedy ap-
proach of prior works on the 184 families that were discussed above.
This will show that AutoYara dominates YarGen with respect to Fβ
score, and that the Greedy approach does not work when only a
small number of samples are given. Second, we will do a larger scale
test that simulates behavior in a malware hunt situation, where an
analyst deploys to a remote network and has the goal of finding
malware on a network that is known or suspected to be compro-
mised. This will show that we can generate rules with extremely
low false positives, even when querying against ≥90,000,000 files.
Third, we will perform a true real-world task with AutoYara com-
pared to two professional analysts performing their work at Elastic,
which shows that AutoYara can be a useful tool as it matches pro-
fessional analyst performance on a number of malware families.
6.1 Large Scale Testing
In this first experiment, we are interested in the applicability of
all methods to creating Yara rules over a large range of families
and sample sizes ranging from n = 2 to n = 212 examples. The
Greedy approach quickly becomes disqualified due to not generat-
ing enough viable rules, producing ≤ 17 samples with a FPR≤ 0.1%
for n ≥ 8 samples. VxSig is also disqualified from this section be-
cause it is too computational demanding to run, requiring an esti-
mated 603 years to run over all settings. This leaves YarGen and
AutoYara which can be tested across all 184 families and sample
sizes. AutoYara produced 50-114 viable rules for each value of n,
and YarGen produced 6 − 121 variable rules for each value of n.
We compare the average Fβ score between AutoYara and YarGen
over the viable rules (≤ 0.1% FPR) generated from VirusShare in
Figure 3. This shows that AutoYara produces rules of a significantly
higher quality than YarGen. In fact, rules generated by YarGen are
not generally usable until 128 samples are given, which is more than
an analyst would have available in most situations. This is particu-
larly true for hunt missions, which we will discuss in Section 6.2.
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Figure 3: Comparison of AutoYara and YarGen average Fβ
score on 184malware families. Confidence intervals are con-
structed using the Jacknife resampling.
To further explain why AutoYara produces a higher score, and
that false positives alone are insufficient, we plot the Fβ score of
all generated rules in Figure 4, where the x-axis shows the false
positive rate (log scale) and the y-axis the true positive rate (linear
scale). The size of the dots show how many files were used to create
the rule, ranging from 2 to 256 for visual clarity. YarGen contains
a a majority of rules all located at the bottom left corner with 0%
FP and 0% TP, making the rules ineffective. The only rules that
obtain higher TP rates are those trained on more files, and we can
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Figure 4: Scatter plot of the Fβ score achieved by individual
rules created from AutoYara and YarGen on 184 malware
families. Dot size indicates the number of training samples
used to create the rule. The black dashed line shows the de-
siredminimum false positive rate of 0.1%, and the solid lines
show the curve to achieve a minimum Fβ = 0.95, 0.75, 0.5.
see that YarGen suffers a bias of decreasing TP rate as the FP rate
increases. This is the worst case performance behavior and shows
how it biases YarGen to obtaining lower Fβ scores.
In contrast, AutoYara produces several rules with 0 false positives
at a variety of true positive rates. It can also be seen that as the TP
rate increases at 0 FPs, the number of samples trained on increases,
causing the average Fβ score to increase with sample size. This
demonstrates our strategy is succeeding in obtaining low FPs over
a wide range of sample sizes. In the cases where AutoYara does not
produce as good a rule in terms of FPs, it is not biased toward also
lowering its TP rate — allowing it to obtain generally better rules
for any fixed desired FP rate.
Due to YarGen’s performance, and the highmonetary and human
time cost to perform the experiments detailed in the following
sections, we do not further consider it in comparison to AutoYara.
6.2 Retro Hunt Results
Our second round of testing is motivated by a common type of
“hunt” team operation, where analysts will deploy to networks
that they are not familiar with to search for malware present on
those networks. Such an operation may be spurred by knowledge
or supposition of a compromised network, and may or may not
include knowledge of what kind of malware is being searched for.
When malware is found on the network, analysts often begin
to search the rest of the network for malware of the same type.
AutoYara can be used to accelerate this task by constructing rules
from a small set of observed files, and then analysts can use Yara
with existing tooling to scan the larger network. In this application
false positives on other malicious families are still useful, though
not the target. Any malware found on the network is of interest to
analysts and may be important, even if it was not of the same type
Table 1: Results analyzing files returned by VirusTotal Retro
Hunt given a Yara rule generated using AutoYara and VxSig.
Best method shown in bold. TP%, FP% on malware, and FP%
on benign ware is estimated based on up to 50 samples re-
turned by VT.
Family/Samples Method New VT Hits TP% FP% Mal FP% Benign
APT 26 Fancy Bear AutoYara ≥10,000 0 92 8
28 VxSig 4,079 0 98 2
APT 28 AutoYara ≥10,000 2 54 44
61 VxSig N/A — — —
ATMDtrack_DPRK AutoYara 2 100 0 0
3 VxSig 0 — — —
CloudHopper/APT10 AutoYara 5,118 0 100 0
229 VxSig 1,251 0 92 6
CobaltGroup AutoYara ≥10,000 0 98 2
9 VxSig 1 0 100 0
Dridex AutoYara 36 100 0 0
5 VxSig 1 100 0 0
Dyre AutoYara 1 100 0 0
8 VxSig ≥10,000 2 92 16
EquationGroup AutoYara 4 100 0 0
10 VxSig 1 100 0 0
GamaredonGroup AutoYara 26 100 0 0
7 VxSig ≥10,000 0 76 24
GrandCrab AutoYara 62 100 0 0
7 VxSig N/A — — —
GreenBugAPT AutoYara 5 100 0 0
4 VxSig 5 100 0 0
GreyEnergy AutoYara 2 100 0 0
3 VxSig 2 100 0 0
OlympicDestroyer AutoYara 2 100 0 0
4 VxSig 5 80 20 0
Shamoon AutoYara 0 — — —
2 VxSig 1 100 0 0
Sofacy AutoYara 453 6 54 40
3 VxSig ≥10,000 0 72 28
Sugar AutoYara 923 100 0 0
17 VxSig 1,764 56 44 0
Thrip AutoYara ≥10,000 0 98 2
76 VxSig ≥10,000 0 98 2
Turla (Uroburos) AutoYara ≥10,000 0 90 10
11 VxSig ≥10,000 0 88 12
WannaCry AutoYara 6520 100 0 0
2 VxSig N/A — — —
Petya AutoYara ≥10,000 0 2 98
5 VxSig 482 2 98 0
that was expected. Only benign false positives are a nuisance in
this case, as they divert analyst time into investigating non-issues.
To simulate this scenario, we use the Retro Hunt capability of
VirusTotal[1] (VT), combined with samples of malware shared by
Twitter user @0xffff08002. For each family, we use AutoYara and
VxSig to construct a Yara rule, and submit that rule to Retro Hunt.
Retro Hunt will then return hits against that rule for all executables
submitted to VirusTotal within the last 90 days. With over one
million new unique files submitted per day3, this allows us to get a
2https://twitter.com/0xffff0800/status/1155876158740869121
3https://www.virustotal.com/en/statistics/
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Table 2: Comparing against three professional analysts. For each cell, we report the family coverage rate (top), false positive
rate (middle) and time required inminutes to create the rule (bottom). Analyst B used YarGen as part of theirwork.Highlighted
columns indicate an automated tool produced a usable rule (≤ 0.1% FP). Bold indicates best results for tooling.
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66.67 14.29 100 94.12 50.00 76.92 23.07 20 41.18 66.67 84.62 100 75.00 88.24 66.67 83.33 0 56.25 20.00 26.67 88.24 66.67 61.54 66.67
50.73 0 0 0 14.19 0 0.0017 0.00050 0 0 0.00025 0 0 0 0 0.00075 0 0.0025 0 0 0 0 0 0AutoYara
0.9 1.3 1.5 1.5 0.9 7.6 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.5 0.7 1.0 1.5 2.6 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.2 0.8 6.0 1.9 0.4 1.5
better understanding about false-positive rates. The terms of our
VT subscription limit the number of queries we are allowed to run,
and so only AutoYara and VxSig are evaluated in this section.
We submitted AutoYara rules for 14 malware families to VT, with
the results shown in Table 1. Lines that begin with “N/A” indicate a
failure to produce a rule, which only happened with VxSig. Note
that in each of these cases, AutoYara was able to produce a rule
with 100% TP rate. This may indicate a strength to our approach
allowing for signature construction from all portions of the file.
In many cases VT returns only a few hits, but some rules return
hundreds if not thousands of hits. Due to the time-intensive nature
of analyzing these results, we only review up to 50 returned hits
to estimate the results. We can see that AutoYara achieves a 100%
TP rate on 11 out of the 20 families, requiring no human interac-
tion at all. This is noteworthy due to the fact that these rules are
run over 90 million files, indicating our biclustering approach ob-
tains exceptionally low false-positive rates. In 15 of the 20 cases
AutoYara performed better or had identical results as VxSig. In half
of the instances where VxSig performed better, the results were a
marginal improvement but still did not obtain any TP hits (APT26
and CobaltGroup).
There are some failure cases, of varying degrees of severity. The
Shamoon malware did not fire on any new samples, so no results
were returned. In this case we learn nothing from the rule, but no
analyst time was wasted on false positives. The Sofacy malware
returns 60% malware, though most of which appears to be from
other families. This result is still useful in the hunt situation, but the
FP rate on benign applications is still high. The Petya rule generated
had a significant false positive issue, and would not be informative
in practice.
Overall these results are encouraging, and indicate that AutoYara
can be useful for hunt activities when a limited number of examples
of malware may be available. We are able to generate useful rules
in the majority of cases, using a small number of samples, often
with no false positives over 90 million files.
6.3 Industry Human Comparison Testing
Our last test is based on real-world work performed by professional
malware researchers. As part of day-to-day operations, a need to
develop Yara rules to detect known and particularly challenging
families exists. Three malware analysts were asked to develop Yara
rules for 24 malware families. The stated goal was to provide max-
imal coverage for malware samples with minimal false-positive
rate. While there is some tolerance for cross-tagging other mali-
cious families with a Yara rule intended for a single family, a false
positive rate of ≥ 0.1% on benign files was unacceptable.
The results with TP and FP rates are shown in Table 2, where
Analysts A and B are both considered experts with multiple years
of experience. Analyst B used YarGen as part of their standard
workflow, and found it was insufficient on its own in all cases —
so Analyst B’s results subsume YarGen. Several rows of the table
are empty because neither analyst was able to complete all their
work, and new priorities eventually subsumed these and were never
completed. This high demand on their time, and its time intensive
nature, is part of the problem we are trying to solve. For example,
Analyst B spent 78 minutes on the baldr family, but did not create
a usable rule due to a false-positive rate of 11.8%. Analyst C was
not a part of the business workflow, and so was able to spend two
weeks generating signatures for all 24 families.
On this production data, the results of AutoYara are significant.
For 21/24 families, AutoYara successfully produced useful rules
with reasonable TP rates and exceptionally low FP rates, either
obtaining exactly 0 FPs on over 400,000 test files, or extremely low
rates such as 0.00025%. While AutoYara usually performed slightly
worse than analysts, it produced better results than one or more
analysts on 10/24 of the families (bkff, ertfor, firefly, navattle, nezchi,
olympicdestroyer, phds, sekur, subroate, and wuca). Based on these
results, Analyst B could have saved 44% of the time they spent
working on families that AutoYara was able to capture, and instead
focused on the more difficult samples like baldr, darkvnc, or plurox.
Similarly, Analyst C could have saved 86% and Analyst A could
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have saved 100% of their time, and could have instead focused on
these more challenging cases that did not avail to automation.
In comparison, the Greedy approach used by many prior works
was only able to produce usable rules on 5/24 families, and only
on the easiest samples. VxSig was able to produce rules for 10/24
families, only half of AutoYara. Note that in only two instances
did VxSig outperform an analyst, and it requires up to 7.9 hours to
process a single family. This significantly hampers VxSig’s usability.
Table 3: AutoYara results improved
by an inexperienced user with one at-
tempt at editing the produced rule.
Time Human+AutoYara
Family (min) TP% FP%
baofa 2 50 0
darkvnc 1 50 0.83
jongiti 2 70.59 0
ladyoffice 1 100 0
subroate 2 46.67 0
zcash 1 100 0
Another benefit
to AutoYara is that
it is easy for an
Analyst to mod-
ify the rule to im-
prove the perfor-
mance. In Table 3
we show the re-
sults where a user
with only one course
on reverse engi-
neering, and no
professional expe-
rience developing
rules, attempted to
modify the rules
produced by AutoYara. For these 6 families they were able to im-
prove the TP/FP rate, requiring only a few minutes for each file.
7 WHENWILL AUTOYARAWORKWELL?
We now investigate some of the reasons why/when AutoYara will
work well. First we will show that structural consistency in byte
strings across samples is related to AutoYara’s performance, which
is expected. Diving deeper, we investigate the generated rules to
better understand the type of content AutoYara uses, how the gen-
erated rules perform, and how the performance compares to a do-
main expert’s results.
7.1 Byte Similarity Investigation
To help better understand when and why AutoYara performs well,
we performed an investigation of the similarity between malware
samples using SSDEEP[13]. SSDEEP creates a similarity digest from
the raw bytes of the input files, and can return a score in the range of
0 to 100. In general, any score ≥ 20 is a “match”, and scores quickly
drop off to 0 for non-similar content. While SSDEEP comparisons
are heuristic, we found visualizing the connected components of
malware families based on their pairwise SSDEEP scores to be a
useful diagnostic.
For example, in Figure 5a and Figure 5b we see the graphs cre-
ated for the Olympic Destroyer and Dragonmess malware families.
Both families exhibit clustering into a few densely connected sub-
graphs. Unsurprisingly, AutoYara rules perform very well on these
families. The intuition is that the high byte similarity of these in-
puts make for convenient rules. These results support the claim
that a biclustering based approach to represent a single family is
fruitful. The data itself tends to lead to natural sub-family popula-
tions which are easier to represent with the biclustering process.
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(b) Dragonmess
Figure 5: Connected components graph based on SSDEEP
similarities for two families where AutoYara did well.
We found that AutoYara had a higher failure rate for the AVClass-
labeled corpus, compared to the production data. We suspect that
this was caused by a larger amount of label noise in those tests, since
the AVClass tool is not perfect, and depends on the output from
several AV products —which are also not perfect. This accumulation
of error could have caused increased noise, making any attempts
at rule construction difficult.
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Figure 6: Families where AutoYara did not perform well.
The graphs in Figure 6a and Figure 6b support this hypothe-
sis, showing much greater disparity in pairwise similarity of files
from the Xpaj and Zlob families that were most challenging for
rules produced by AutoYara. While there are dominant clusters, the
presence of a large number of small tuples indicates a potentially
noisy input set that would thus reduce the effectiveness of any tool
attempting to produce a useful rule.
7.2 Reverse Engineering Investigation
In addition, we conducted reverse engineering of the rules that
AutoYara created. We looked at rules generated for the Baldr and
Conju family in detail, and noticed that all the main file section
were targeted. Rules targeting the resource sections were strings
belonging to the application manifest and DLL names, rules in the
text sections pointed to regular functions blocks, rules in the data
section were long strings not easily interpretable, and in the case
of the Conju family many of the rules targeted the decompression
stub of UPX. In general the content of the AutoYara rules were
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(a) AutoYara-generated rules
ba
ld
r
ba
of
a
bk
ff
co
nj
u
da
rk
vn
c
dr
ag
on
m
es
s
er
tfo
r
fir
ef
ly
jo
ng
iti
la
dy
of
fic
e
na
va
ttl
e
ne
zc
hi
ol
ym
pi
cd
es
tro
ye
r
ph
ds
ph
ot
om
in
er
pi
ka
ch
u
pl
ur
ox
po
tu
ko
rp
se
ku
r
su
br
oa
te
wi
ni
nf
wu
ca
xp
an
tis
py
wa
re
zc
as
h
.text
.rdata
.data
.rsrc
.reloc
MMS
UPX
.nsp
OTHER
.vmp
Fi
le
 S
ec
tio
n
100 21 3 43 24 1 27 25
5 67 25 60 86 4
100 12 100 100 100 75 30 2 14 54 50
8 51 9 77 16 75 34 100 32 10 60 21 25 53
13
4 50 11 16 2
50 17 3 25 27 43
72
8 1
92 100
Manual
20
40
60
80
100
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f Y
ar
a 
ru
le
's 
st
rin
gs
 ta
rg
et
in
g 
fil
e 
se
ct
io
n
(b) Manually-generated rules
Figure 7: File sections targeted byAutoYara and analyst show
that both tend to use similar section to generate rules. Auto-
Yara tends to target the .text section, while analyst tend to
target the .data section. “MMS” describes rules that were in
multiple file sections; “OTHER” corresponds condensed file
sections that were not relevant to our analysis.
reasonable items to target. For code sections in particular, AutoYara
did not tend to target the exact same functions, but the functions
selected seemed reasonably specific of the sample.
We also analyzed the different file sections each of the rules gen-
erated by AutoYara and Analyst C (the only analyst to investigate
all malware families, hence we use their results). Figure 7a and
Figure 7b shows that both AutoYara and our analyst wrote rules tar-
geting the .text, .rdata, .data, .rsrc, and .reloc sections. We
also noticed that when AutoYara generated rules, it had a tendency
to target the .text section, whereas our analyst tended to write
rules targeting the data section. It’s likely that AutoYara targets
the .text section due to its high entropy and because it can find
blocks of instructions that are shared across multiple binaries. On
the other hand, analysts tend to use the data section more because
it contains globally accessible or predefined data such as strings or
constants that are easier to identify, extract, and understand. The
tendency of AutoYara to target high-entropy areas can also con-
tribute to its small bias towards the .UPX1 sections of UPX-packed
binaries (shown as positive values on the UPX row in Figure 7a).
However, further exploration of this subject is needed to determine
if there are strong correlations, or if this is an artifact of our small
sample size. Due to the high cost of such experiments such a larger
manual study may be difficult to perform. We are aware of no other
work that has compared manual-vs-automatic generated rules.
Finally, we look at the commonality in rule behavior, with results
in Table 4. X¯ indicates themean number of file sections (e.g., X¯ = 2 if
.text and .data are represented in the rule) that a rule component
(each string within a Yara rule) hit upon in the test data. Using
this we can see that AutoYara and manually built rules have a
high correlation, both tending to have strings that hit only one file
section, or multiple section, indicating that a degree of similarity
in the types of content used.
The Similarity column indicates the overlap in the test set for
what executables the final rule triggered on. A similarity of 100%
means that AutoYara and the human analyst’s intersection is per-
fect, and 0% indicates no overlap in the files flagged. From these
results we see that again, AutoYara and manual domain expert con-
structed rules tend to agree upon and find similar files in the test
set, with most differences caused by differing false-positive rates
(e.g., ladyoffice, where AutoYara has only 2 hits that are TPs, and
the analyst hits only the 3 TPs).
8 CONCLUSION
Using large byte-based n-grams combined with a new biclustering
algorithm, we have developed AutoYara, a new approach to auto-
matically constructing Yara rules from an example set of malware
families. In many cases AutoYara can perform as well as an expert
analyst, and production testing indicates it could save an analyst
over 44% of their time spent making Yara rules. This can allow an-
alysts to get through more of their workload, and spend human
effort on the most challenging cases that are currently beyond au-
tomation.
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A EXTRA NUANCE DETAILS OF AUTOYARA
As presented, the version of AutoYara described will be effective
and matches the approach our implementation takes. We make
note of small enhancements that we found improved the reliability
of our results. First, rather than picking just scale or bistochastic
based normalization, we use both approaches. We run each indi-
vidually, create a rule, and select the best rule according to the
input set coverage as described in Algorithm 3. Statistical testing
has found there is no significant difference in the performance of
each approach, so one is not uniformly better than the other. But
on individual cases, one may perform better.
A second detail that was tested, but not included, is to run the
Variational GMM multiple times. We found this can be helpful as
the VGMM approach is not deterministic, and sometimes converges
to local optima that do not perform well. However this is expensive.
Instead, if clustering fails we fall back to using HDBSCAN on the
inputs, selecting “biclusters” as the returned clusters constrained
to the features that occurred in more than 50% of the clusters. This
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again was not necessary for our approach to work, but a micro-
optimization we found improved the reliability of our results.
B VXSIG APPROACH
For completeness on the VxSig approach and reproducibility, we
will describe how we used it and the results here. VxSig requires
a tool called BinDiff, which is used to compare the similarity of
assembly sequences and their control flow graph. We used VxSig
with Ghidra4, a reverse engineering tool developed by the NSA.
Ghidra performs the disassembly of the executables, exporting the
results to a “BinExport” format, which is used by BinDiff to find
common assembly blocks between multiple programs. VxSig uses
this result to create a rule from the largest common sub-sequences
of assembly instructions shared by all of the inputs. This is the
general approach described by Blichmann [5].
In using VxSig it is possible to set it up to run in a completely
automated fashion, disassemble each sample from a family, run
BinDiff, and produce the Yara Rule. In practice, we found that this
almost always resulted in a failure to build a rule (i.e, the tool VxSig
itself would throw an error as it was unable to find any common
sub-sequence) or produce a degenerate rule that matched all or no
executables. As such, VxSig was only able to run successfully on
the jongiti in a fully automated fashion. To get results for all other
families, we followed the below process:
(1) Attempt to disassemble all files
(2) Compute the average number of disassembled bytes, and
discard any sample that had more than 1 standard deviation
more or less bytes (i.e., too many or too few instructions)
(3) Run BinDiff and attempt to produce a rule.
(4) If VxSig still fails, try VxSig on only each pair of inputs —
and find the pairs that produce good rules.
(5) Run VxSig on only the found pairs that worked individually.
If it still fails, pick the pair of inputs that had the largest
similarity.
The primary issue is VxSig’s requirement to match all inputs,
which is not reliable. Many malware samples fail to disassemble
without analyst intervention, which can make VxSig fail due to
having no input to operate on. This occurred with the bkff, APT36,
GrandCrab, and WannaCry samples. A larger issue is that malware
samples can be intentionally malformed, and disassembly may run
“successfully” but produce a bad disassembly sequence. In this case,
it becomes impossible for VxSig to match the badly parsed file to
other inputs. This is common as disassembly is a non-trivial task,
in which malware authors intentionally attempt to thwart or at
least slow the work of analysts.
That said, when VxSig works, it can be quite powerful. It was
the only method to produce a usable rule for the baldr family, and
produced better rules than AutoYara in 6 cases for our production
data. However, in most cases VxSig fails to match new samples of
the family and has higher false-positive rates than AutoYara. We
see VxSig as being complementary, and a tool to be used by analysts
on the most difficult malware families that tools like AutoYara can
not handle. These instances already require manual intervention,
and the work an analyst may do as part of their normal process to
4https://ghidra-sre.org/
reverse engineer the samples (to find something to make a signature
out of) will aid in building a more effective signature from VxSig.
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